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ABSTRACT Based on longitudinal case studies of manufacturing strategy and 
implementation at two Chinese manufacturing firms, this paper investigates how these firms 
develop, manage and deploy dynamic capabilities to renew their resource bases in order to 
respond to the operational challenges associated with radical technological development. Our 
analysis suggests that dynamic capability development is not simply about renewing one 
specific type of capability, but rather, it is a meta-capability to learn how to repeatedly renew 
the firm’s overall capability set as a fully integrated package. We further highlight the 
importance of looking beyond the property of the firm to understand the network level of 
capability development, including the capabilities of the firm’s partners. This is particularly 
salient in the context of smart manufacturing where a high level of connectivity among a 
broader network of partners is required to reap the benefits generated by new technological 
advances. Our findings provide an important contribution to our knowledge of dynamic 
capability development in emerging economies in the era of digitalized manufacturing.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Triggered by the internet, the astonishing rise in data volumes and cyber physical 
connectivity enables communication between humans as well as machines in cyber-physical 
internet-based systems to acquire and process data and to self-control certain tasks (Manyika 
et al., 2011). This technological shift is radically transforming the performance of 
manufacturing activities. Consequently, many countries with important manufacturing sectors 
are exploring ways to revolutionize and renew their existing manufacturing competencies. In 
this context, new manufacturing capabilities need to be established to enable firms to extend 
and renew their resource bases in order to respond effectively to rapid technological 
developments. Central to this view is an emphasis on dynamic capability development (e.g., 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Williamson, 2016; Zollo, 
Bettinazzi, Neumann, & Snoeren, 2016). Broadly defined, dynamic capability is an 
organization’s capacity to purposefully create, extend or modify its resource base to achieve 
sustainable advantages through adaptation to the changing shape of the external environment 
(Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997). 
Radical technological change often creates capability gaps for manufacturing firms 
because it introduces new ways of performing manufacturing activities, and new ways of 
creating value. This is particularly challenging for manufacturing firms from emerging 
economies accustomed to leveraging labor-intensive and low-specialist technological skills to 
manufacture simple products in order to serve low cost market segments (Aggarwal & 
Weekly, 1982; Malik & Kotabe, 2009; Wells, 1983). With historically low emphasis on R&D 
and consequently weak technological capabilities (Henderson & Cockburn, 2000; West & 
DeCastro, 2001), the processes of developing new capabilities for firms from emerging 
economies responding to radical technological change are quite distinct from R&D based on 
learning before doing (Henderson & Cockburn, 2000). The institutional characteristics of 
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emerging economies are also greatly different from those of industrialized economies (Meyer 
& Peng, 2005; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskissen, & Peng, 2005). Therefore, an interesting 
question arises: how do manufacturing firms in emerging economies renew their existing 
resource bases in order to respond to radical technological developments?  
We chose manufacturing firms in China to pursue our research question for three 
reasons. First, low resource cost has long been the key advantage for China’s manufacturing 
industry. However, this advantage is being challenged with the development of digitalized 
manufacturing as a different set of capabilities are required to respond to radical industry 
change. Manufacturing firms in China’s transformation from low cost to digitalized 
manufacturing processes therefore present unique problems and research opportunities. 
Second, as the world’s largest manufacturing hub, China is exerting a growing impact on the 
global economy (Roach, 2003). Due to the size of its economy and the extent of its 
engagement in the global manufacturing sector (Peng & Luo, 2000), understanding how 
manufacturing companies in China are transforming to embrace new technology 
developments is a timely undertaking for both China and the world with which it increasingly 
engages. Third, China presents a distinctive institutional environment (Whetten, 2009), which 
requires the theoretical incorporation of specific socio-economic contexts, a theme 
highlighted by many scholars in the business and management field (Lewin, 2014; Whetten, 
2009). This setting thus provides a useful context to explore our research questions. 
Our study makes an important contribution to the dynamic capability literature by 
answering the call to identify capabilities that lead to superior performance in a specific 
context (Collis, 1994; Priem & Butler, 2001; Williamson, 2016). Drawing from longitudinal 
qualitative data, our findings illuminate a process model that not only shows how dynamic 
capabilities are formed and developed, but also sheds light on the specific mechanisms which 
interconnect different stages of their development in manufacturing firms in China. We argue 
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that dynamic capability development is not simply about renewing one specific type of 
capability, but rather, it is a meta-capability to learn how to repeatedly renew the firm’s 
overall capability set as a fully integrated package. This is consistent with theoretical insights 
highlighting dynamic capability as a ‘“higher order capability’” or ‘“meta-capability’” that 
relates to learning to learn (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Collis, 1994; Lewin, Massini, & 
Peeters, 2011; Teece, 2007, 2012).  
This study therefore provides a holistic and more comprehensive understanding of the 
process by which manufacturing firms from emerging economies develop capabilities which 
enable them to thrive in a new industry era. By doing so, we make an important contribution 
to the existing literature on the micro-foundation of capabilities and their evolution over time 
in the context of a fast-changing and volatile environment (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; 
Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997). We further highlight the importance of looking beyond the 
perimeter (Zollo et al., 2016) of the firm to understand the network level of capability 
development, including the capabilities of the firm’s partners. In this way, firms can 
simultaneously co-evolve with their partners to ensure the evolutionary fitness (e.g., Helfat et 
al., 2007) of increasingly co-specialized asset configurations (Siggelkow, 2002).  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. We first review the concept of 
dynamic capability and its application to emerging economies. We then set out the research 
design and method of this study. This is followed by a discussion of our findings where we 
distil the theoretical insights that emerge from this study and present some theoretical and 
practical implications. Finally, we identify the limitations of our study and suggest avenues 
for future research. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
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The recent literature on dynamic capabilities in emerging economies provides some key 
concepts as a theoretical foundation for our research. Central to the origins of competitive 
advantage is the question of how the firm manages its resources to create more value than its 
rivals (Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996). Rooted in the early contribution of Penrose (1959), 
the resource-based view (RBV) postulates that possessing valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable resources provides the basis for value creation (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
In this view, success is mainly attributable to superior resource endowment (Barney, 1991; 
Peteraf & Barney, 2003). With the increasing recognition that the current business 
environment is hypercompetitive (D’Aveni, 1994) and highly volatile (Eisenhardt, 1989b), 
the dynamic capability view (Teece et al., 1997) was introduced to complement the RBV by 
identifying the capabilities which help firms to successfully apply their resources across 
multiple environments and situations. While the RBV asserts that firms create superior 
economic return by being more effective than their rivals at possessing and selecting 
resources, the dynamic capability perspective asserts that firms generate economic rent by 
being more effective than their rivals at deploying and reconfiguring resources. 
Often referred to as repetitive task-oriented actions involving multiple actors (Winter, 
2003), dynamic capabilities are created by organizational learning (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000) in a process of co-evolution of past experience, knowledge articulation and knowledge 
codification processes (Zollo & Winter, 2002). Teece (2012) further explicitly argues that 
dynamic capabilities cannot be reduced to routines, but are something above and beyond 
these. This view is shared by scholars who view dynamic capability as meta-capability 
(Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Lewin et al., 2011) where ‘“the capability that wins tomorrow 
is the capability to develop the capability to develop capability that innovates faster (or 
better), and so on’” (Collis, 1994: 148). It has been claimed that the development of such 
capabilities is constrained by the firm’s existing base of capabilities, and is shaped by its 
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current market position and path dependent history of developing capabilities (Teece et al., 
1997). The notion of orchestration has been introduced to describe capability development in 
the context of the extended enterprise (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2007). For example, Teece 
(2007) proposed the concept of co-specialization where the value of an asset is a function of 
its use in conjunction with other assets. Capturing co-specialization benefits frequently 
requires integrating operations, and an organization’s ability to identify, develop and leverage 
specialized and co-specialized assets, built or bought, is a core dynamic capability (Augier & 
Teece, 2007).  
A small but growing stream of enquiry in the literature focuses on dynamic capability 
development and deployment in emerging economies. Compared to firms in advanced 
countries, firms from emerging economies often face unique challenges in developing their 
capabilities due to resource scarcities and ideology-based institutional imprinting 
(Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006; Malik & Kotabe, 2009). Due to lack of availability of 
domestically produced capital equipment and technologies (Tybout, 2000), these firms 
typically produce less advanced products (Aggarwal & Weekly, 1982) to serve low cost 
market segments (Wells, 1983). Most manufacturing firms therefore rely heavily on 
equipment and technologies imported from industrialized countries (Tybout, 2000). Given 
this lack of technological and product focused R&D capabilities (West & DeCastro, 2001), a 
specific set of capabilities to integrate externally sourced technologies with firm-level 
routines is required to upgrade the firm’s performance.  
Following this observation, there have been numerous studies of the capability 
development of firms from emerging economies. These include investigations of Russian oil 
companies (e.g., Dixon & Day, 2010; Dixon, Meyer, & Day, 2014), Indian and Pakistani 
manufacturing firms (e.g., Malik & Kotabe, 2009), the Indian pharmaceutical industry (e.g., 
Athreye, Kale, & Ramani, 2009; Kale, 2010), a South Korean motor company (e.g., Kim, 
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1997), a diverse set of innovative Chinese companies (Williamson, 2016) and the Taiwanese 
semi-conductor industry (e.g., Mathews & Cho, 2000). For example, Dixon and Day (2010) 
and Dixon, Meyer and Day (2014) identified two distinctive types of dynamic capability: 
adaptation and innovation, which helped to achieve both short-term and long-term 
competitive advantages in the context of a Russian Oil Company. Malik and Kotabe (2009) 
identified three dynamic capability development mechanisms, namely organizational learning, 
reverse engineering and manufacturing flexibilities, which had significant impact on firm 
performance in India and Pakistan. Williamson (2016) indicated that creating flexible 
organizational structures and processes is key for Chinese firms to build and leverage 
dynamic capability.  
At the outset, capability development is also constrained by the institutional 
environment in which firms are embedded in (Meyer & Peng, 2005). Many scholars have 
highlighted that the institutional context of emerging economies is significantly different 
from that of industrialized economies (Wright et al., 2005) because each have highly 
distinctive resource pools and highly distinctive game rules (Li, 1994; 2010). As the most 
singular of the emerging economies, China presents a distinctive institutional environment 
(Whetten, 2009; Peng & Luo, 2000). Until recently, the Chinese manufacturing sector has 
leveraged competitive advantage in the global market from the country’s vast population and 
relatively low wage rates. However, the advantages associated with these resources and assets 
are being challenged in the context of digitalized manufacturing (Magnier, 2016). As the 
primary driving force of economic reform (Peng & Luo, 2000), the Chinese government has 
proposed a new plan ‘“Made in China 2025’”, which aims to build an intelligent, digitalized 
and networked Chinese manufacturing sector (Bland, 2015). This transition has created a 
novel ‘“non-market’” environment for those manufacturing firms that have low technological 
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and specialist skills and have been heavily relying on cheap labor and imported technologies 
to manufacture their products. 
Taken together, the unique institutional characteristics in China, coupled with radical 
technology changes, lead to firm-level changes in resources and capabilities that are different 
from those in industrialized economies. Despite the significant effort invested by the 
academic community to create dynamic capability theory, ‘“we have limited understanding of 
where capabilities come from or what kinds of investment in money, time and managerial 
effort is required in building them’” (Ethiraj, Kale, Jrishanan, & Singh, 2005: 25). 
Encouraged by recent calls to develop and test theory pertaining to firms from emerging 
economies (Meyer, 2015; Tsui, 2006; 2007; Whetten, 2009; Wright et al., 2005), we address 
our research question by building upon the theory of dynamic capability to specifically 
explore how manufacturing firms in China purposefully develop, manage and deploy 
capabilities to renew their resource bases in order to respond to the technological challenge.  
 
METHOD 
Given the relatively new and unexplored nature of the phenomenon, we pursued an 
induction-driven research design that is suitable for generating theory about novel 
phenomena (Locke, 2001). Consistent with the evolutionary and interpretive nature of our 
analysis (Maitlis, 2005; Weick, 1993), we conducted a longitudinal field study (Yin, 2014) 
using two innovative Chinese manufacturing companies as our primary source of empirical 
evidence. This approach allowed us to obtain a fine-grained appreciation of the processes that 
contribute to dynamic capability development over an extended period of time. 
 
Sample 
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We adopted a theoretical sampling method (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Miles & Huberman, 1994) 
and selected cases based on several criteria that helped to illuminate the processes we were 
seeking to describe. First, we compiled a list of Chinese manufacturing firms that are actively 
engaged in ‘“smart manufacturing’” practices and therefore provide an opportunity to 
investigate how firms develop manufacturing capabilities that assist them to embrace the 
development of new technologies. Second, following the suggestions provided by Block and 
MacMillan (1985) and Yin (2014), two similar companies were chosen from the initial 
sample of 7 that were closely matched with regards to their starting conditions and stages of 
new venture developments. This enabled us to control the differences in terms of the (1) 
timing of entry, (2) availability of resources, and (3) new venture development as factors 
associated with competitive advantage (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). The selected 
manufacturing sectors are textiles and electronic goods, and we call our two case companies 
Tie and Sho. We ensured that our case firms were quite similar in their capability to 
reallocate their resources in response to radical technological change as this parallel process 
tracing is an integral part of most similar case analysis (Tarrow, 2010). Table 1 provides an 
overview of the firms. Choosing case firms that were relatively similar in many aspects had 
several advantages: firstly, it made possible a deeper investigation of their capability 
development paths (Laamanen & Wallin, 2009; Langley, 1999); secondly, it enabled 
emerging conceptual insights from one case to be confirmed or disconfirmed by comparative 
evidence from the other case (Yin, 2014); and thirdly, it allowed us to control for potential 
confounding of the relationships of theoretical interest (Nielsen, 2016). Due to the sensitive 
nature and depth of the information sought, accessibility also influenced the selection of 
specific firms.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Data Collection  
Research access was negotiated through a personal contact who introduced two researchers to 
the selected companies in April, 2009. We considered this approach appropriate and 
necessary in the context of China, as informants may not be willing to share information with 
unfamiliar interviewers (Hwang, 1987; Tsang, 1998). Two rounds of interviews were carried 
out in order to collect the primary evidence, the first being in July-September 2009. At that 
stage, semi-structured interviews were arranged with top and middle management as well as 
lower-echelon employees at the case sites. The main benefit of selecting informants from 
different hierarchical levels was to ensure exposure to different perspectives, to compensate 
for individual informants’ personal bias and lack of knowledge, and to allow cross-checking 
of information provided by different informants (Huber & Power, 1985). Interviews typically 
lasted 90 to 150 minutes. In total 36 interviews were conducted.  
All interviews were conducted in Chinese. The interview protocol began with general 
questions about the informants and their perceptions of current trends in the industry. 
Informants were then asked about how the changes in China affected the ability of their firms 
to reconfigure their resource bases. This was followed by question sets which invited 
informants to explain how and why decisions were made and actions undertaken to extend or 
reconfigure their firms’ existing resource bases, and how any resulting conflicts were 
resolved. Further questions probing for specific details were asked in subsequent interviews, 
and these were based on information shared by participants during our initial interviews. This 
approach allowed us to investigate emerging themes and to return to specific topics for 
clarification. The interviews were tape recorded (with 6 exceptions) and transcribed verbatim 
within a week of the interviews. In keeping with Eisenhardt and Graebner’s (2007) 
recommendation to bolster the credibility of the data, a ‘“courtroom questioning’” technique 
was used, where informants were encouraged to provide concrete examples to support their 
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commentary about actions taken in the development of their firms’ capabilities. Complete 
anonymity was promised in order to encourage the participants to give candid responses.  
The second round of semi-structured interviews was carried out in April-June, 2014. 
In order to track our firms’ capability development processes, we conducted 21 additional 
interviews designed to further probe the underlying reasoning behind the different stages of 
their evolution. This phase enriched our understanding of the context within which the 
changes took place and allowed us to gather information on specific areas of each 
organization, such as product design and digital systems, which had not been fully 
established in the first round of interviews. Table 2 summarizes the distribution of interviews. 
This approach enabled the collection of both real-time and retrospective data, thus providing 
better grounding for theorization and mitigating any effects of retrospective bias (Leonard-
Barton, 1990). 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
To assure the accuracy of the interview data, we conducted member checks (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985) in which the original informants verified our interview transcripts or notes. The 
interview data were supplemented by secondary data in the form of archived material from 
each company, such as minutes of meetings, internal correspondence and memos, trade 
magazines and relevant media publications. This approach allowed us to triangulate the data 
to mitigate possible informant and other biases, and to supplement personal accounts with 
rich and detailed contextual evidence (Jick, 1979). 
 
Data Analysis  
Consistent with common prescriptions for longitudinal case studies (Langley, 1999; Yin, 
2014), we first wrote individual case histories (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) using data 
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gathered from both interview transcripts and archival material, in particular, of the period 
covering the digital transformation. We endeavored to create a ‘“chain of evidence’” that 
allows others to ‘“follow the derivation of any evidence from initial research questions to 
ultimate case study conclusions’” (Yin, 2014:127). A key step in the analysis was to create an 
event listing to provide insight into ‘“what led to what, and when’” (Miles & Huberman, 
1994: 110), depicting the sequences in which capabilities were developed. We then identified 
specific actions and decisions that were associated with changes in the resources deployed, 
and the configuration of activities at different phases of organizational change. To avoid 
errors arising from halo effects and interpretation biases (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), we 
followed an iterative process of noting quotes and concepts on note cards, symmetrically 
arranging these cards into themes and concepts, and reviewing our notes to identify patterns 
and themes across interviews. We then compared across cases to construct a conceptual 
framework (Eisenhardt, 1989a). This action enabled us to compare the cases to identify 
common dilemmas and refine the unique aspects of each particular case.  
Our regular contacts with both companies allowed us to deepen our understanding of 
specific issues with additional background information and put our findings into perspective. 
We also used discussions of our emergent frameworks with colleagues as well as key 
informants as further validity checks for our emerging interpretations. This procedure 
continued until it was possible to explain the processes that had been observed, and further 
data collection provided no new insights into dynamic capability development (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). The entire analysis was highly iterative and involved moving back and forth 
among the chronology of events, our interview data, the existing literature and the constructs 
that emerged as salient at the research site. In Table 3, we summarize the process of theory 
development through the different stages of analysing the data.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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RESULTS 
From these rich data, a detailed pattern emerged of how two manufacturing firms in China 
renew, modify and extend their existing resource base to respond to technological change. 
This is captured by a model with three phases: establishing a new focus of attention; focusing 
on resource transformation; and co-evolution with the ecosystem. In this section, we follow 
best practices for qualitative research and rely on a detailed account of our observations to 
support our emergent conceptual framework (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In figure 1, we 
have provided a timeline of the emergence and evolution of key actions in the transformation 
process. We intersperse the narratives with significant quotes intended to illustrate our 
interpretation, and we display additional selected quotes in Tables 4-6 to illustrate and 
document the robustness of our claims. We will next present the processes of dynamic 
capability development manifested at the different phases of the firm’s transformation. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Phase 1: Establishing a New Focus of Attention  
The starting point for our model begins as the firm establishes a new strategic direction. Both 
firms changed their focus of attention between 2006 and 2007 after protracted discussions 
about the potential opportunities and threats information technology could bring to traditional 
manufacturing firms. Despite being able to realize rent from their existing resources and 
capabilities, both firms began to question the extent to which the resources associated with 
their existing competitive advantages would be relevant in the future. For example, an 
internal memo circulated by Tie April 2006 stated: ‘“We are entering the winter season for 
manufacturing firms. If we stick with traditional Original Design Manufacture (ODM) or 
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Original Equipment Manufacture (OEM), we will have no future’”. Meetings with top 
management committees were organized to discuss the visions and actions required to 
support the new changes. We noted consistent patterns of capability development during this 
phase of each company’s change of strategic direction: unlearning from past experience; 
investing in new resource base development; and building a collective learning culture. 
Additional selected quotes are presented in Table 4.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Unlearning from past experience and history. For both firms, the most important issue at the 
beginning was to re-evaluate existing strategy and envisage possible changes deemed 
necessary for the new strategic direction. We found that both firms displayed a distinct 
pattern in how they drove the unlearning process to embrace change. Information gathered 
from secondary data such as internal correspondence and minutes of meetings confirmed this 
pattern. While this was a straightforward process for Sho following the arrival of a new 
leadership team, Tie experienced great difficulties in convincing their top management to 
change. In early 2006, a small number of board members started questioning Tie’s existing 
strategy and developed a new vision. However, this vision was widely criticized by other 
senior managers, as reflected in the following observations:  
We had many senior managers in their 50s and 60s on the executive board. They 
know the tricks of the trade, well, for the old game. I remember when I first proposed 
the ideas at the executive meeting, everybody was highly sceptical and one of them 
pulled me to one side after the meeting and said to me: ‘don't ruin your father’s 
business’. (Tie, 004a) 
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In the case of Sho, the newly restructured leadership team was keen to drive the 
changes in Summer 2007. Informants from Sho described how the new management team 
‘“created a rather bold vision’” and ‘“moved away from what they knew in the past’”. The 
concept of unlearning was constantly brought up by our informants as an essential step to 
move forward. One informant observed: 
We have relied on cheap resources such as labor and materials for a very long time. 
So the whole discussion around digital and smart manufacturing sounds rather alien 
to us. We need to empty what is in our minds about what worked in the past and think 
from a new perspective. (Sho, 002a) 
Our evidence suggests then that when changes are radical rather than incremental, the 
direct re-use of routines and processes originating from firms’ path dependent histories and 
experience will be restricted because actions precipitated by such routines reflect the business 
logic of the environment for which they were conceived. This is particularly evident in the 
Chinese context where the manufacture of textiles and electronic products was previously 
labor intensive and where routines developed in a prior environment are no longer fit for the 
new digitalized manufacturing processes.  
 
Investing in new resource bases. Between 2007 and 2010, we noted that both firms had 
invested significantly in infrastructure and talent development at an early stage of digital 
transformation. New capabilities were required not only in IT related domains, but also in 
R&D, managerial talent and the skilled employees. Although both firms were able to import 
advanced technologies and equipment from industrialized economies such as Germany, 
recruiting skilled employees was more challenging. This was highlighted constantly 
throughout our interview. For example, one informant commented:  
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There isn’t much talent available as most of the workforce has only the 9 years’ 
compulsory education in China and nothing more. That was okay in the past, but not 
for the future. We need people with higher and relevant skills to manage and work 
with the machines. Factory work in China has long been associated with low social 
status, so not many graduates are willing to work in factories. (Tie, 005a) 
Archival records such as minutes of meetings and informants’ comments highlighted 
the challenge to both firms due to the lack of people with managerial skills. Indeed, 
digitalized manufacturing requires in-depth understanding of digital processes, systems and 
data, so developing internal managerial knowledge and skills becomes even more critical at a 
time when such skills are sparse in the labor market. However, according to informants, the 
industrial workforce is rather weak in China. Consequently, both firms invested significantly 
in re-training the existing workforce from 2007-2010 to keep pace with the introduction of 
new technologies. The investment in human elements was repeatedly highlighted throughout 
the interview. This kind of investment was referred as ‘“soft investment’”, and was seen as 
equally, or even more, important than “hard investment” (technology, equipment), as 
explained in the following comment: 
We also invested quite heavily in developing talent from the inside of the organization. 
We sent some of our managers to Germany to work on projects along with 
experienced managers to develop tacit managerial knowledge. (Sho, 002a) 
Many informants remarked that for firms that previously focused on leveraging cheap 
resources to achieve competitive advantage, investment in upgrading resources such as 
technology and employee skills was crucial to catch up with manufacturing firms in Europe 
or North America. The extent of this investment in building and acquiring new tangible and 
intangible resource bases was confirmed by archival data. 
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Building a collective learning culture. Whilst emphasizing the importance of integrating the 
new digital strategy throughout the company, both firms pointed out the importance of 
building a collective learning culture to drive people’s desire for change. Both primary and 
secondary data point to the actions that were taken to stimulate a collective learning culture. 
Although information technology was adopted in the early 2000s to improve manufacturing 
efficiency in both firms, comprehensive digital strategies required a different mind-set to go 
beyond existing digital capabilities. Recognizing the potential impact of the new digital 
trends on manufacturing activities required creativity and imagination. One member of the 
senior leadership team from Tie commented:  
It is not all about the technology. It’s also about changes in our mind-set, the business 
model, the regulations and even our environment. All of the changes require new 
knowledge. You need everybody to become like a sponge to soak up new knowledge. 
Without new knowledge, how do you know what and how to change? (Tie, 001a) 
To initiate transformative changes, attention was paid particularly to building an 
emotional connection among the firm’s employees. Rather than pushing for changes, both 
firms developed a compelling vision of what the future organization should look like. This 
vision drove a new, dynamic, learning culture which encouraged employees to reflect on the 
potential changes and impact of the transformation to digitalized manufacturing. This is 
reflected by the following observation: 
We can drive production efficiency by telling them exactly what to do, but we can’t 
force them to think differently and creatively. We provided many learning 
opportunities to stimulate that kind of interaction both within and outside of the firm. 
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Rather than making it compulsory, we wanted people to get excited about the ideas, 
about the future, and this acted as a stimulus to get them to learn. (Sho, 004a) 
This view was confirmed by the lower-echelon employees. According to one 
employee:  
There were many rumours that we were going to lose our jobs and be replaced by 
machines. It was a surprise to us all that so many training development opportunities 
were created for us. What was even more surprising was that they [senior 
management]  told us that having a degree doesn't really matter, that what matters is 
our desire to learn. (Sho, 007a) 
 
Phase 2: Focusing On Resource Transformation  
In phase 2, both firms focused on translating their new strategic focus into tangible action in 
order to embrace technology development from 2008 to 2013. As smart manufacturing 
requires a different type of interaction between people and machines, with significant 
implications for organizational structures, routines and processes, both firms engaged in a set 
of activities to renew and transform their resources. To execute the changes, we noted that in 
phase 2, the focus shifted over time from one capability to another: the capability to 
experiment; the capability to divest; and the capability to build extended networks. 
Additional selected quotes are presented in Table 5. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Experimentation. From our data it is clear that both firms were making small changes and 
experimenting with new processes and routines after building up tangible and intangible 
resources. While Tie spent many years experimenting with new ways of producing tailored 
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garments at mass production price, Sho was trying out a highly automated plant that would 
enable full visibility of operations, remote monitoring and control, and real time optimization 
through new technologies. Informants reported how the emphasis gradually shifted from 
being mainly centred on productivity and efficiency to experimentation and innovation. For 
example, one informant commented:   
Measuring and patterning are the most important and most expensive part of tailored 
production. It took us a while to come up with ‘coordinate measurement’, where you 
only need to locate three points of reference to collect 22 measurements. It is a trial 
and error process. (Tie, 007b) 
Similarly, informants from Sho indicated how experimental learning took place by 
using a virtual plant and products to simulate physical production so that every process is first 
simulated and verified virtually before being introduced and implemented at the physical 
factory level. This evidence was supported by the archival data which documented the 
process of experimentation, from virtual simulation to initial trial and final implementation.  
In addition, our informants brought our attention to the ways their firms were 
experimenting with management styles. After introducing a different operating system which 
connected all the equipment to generate a significant amount of data, the previous 
hierarchical management system became obsolete. Therefore, a new way was required to 
manage the more dispersed data and control the new production process. As one informant 
put it: 
It is no longer about command and control. When you have a manufacturing floor 
where smart machines can make decisions, you need to have people to monitor them, 
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to fix the problems there and then. We had to apply new management skills to support 
the changes that were taking place on the factory floor. (Sho, 010a) 
 
Divesting the existing resource base. There was a consistent pattern in the informants’ 
perceptions regarding the necessity of divesting firm-controlled resources. The new ways of 
integrating information technology required a major cognitive re-orientation. We noted that 
after unlearning their path dependent histories, experiences and routines, both firms re-
evaluated their existing resources and made the decision to shed resources that would no 
longer contribute to their new digitalized manufacturing strategy. Both firms needed to divest 
less-value-adding resources to generate the slack and flexibility needed to acquire or 
accumulate resources of higher value. This capability was highlighted across several 
interviews, and is illustrated by the following comment:  
 You need to completely break it down and see which one is relevant, which one you 
can leverage from your previous investment. That was the difficult part- letting go. 
When the reform started, we were still heavily leveraging on our previous resources 
because we didn’t want to waste anything. This led us on a zigzag path, but you need 
to be decisive and start shedding. (Tie, 005b) 
Selecting the appropriate resources to divest was challenging for both firms. Both 
archival and interview data indicated that it was a lengthy process for both firms to decide 
which resources they could leverage successfully, and which ones they could divest without 
harming their existing competitive advantage. One member from Sho’s senior management 
team pointed out: 
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There were many uncertainties. We made mistakes because we couldn't accurately 
price exactly what was needed and what needed be got rid of. You need to know what 
is upgradable, to what extent, how that will change the process, and in what time 
frame. (Sho, 004b) 
 
Building extended networks. We noted that the term ‘“network’” was constantly repeated 
throughout our interviews during phase two. According to one informant, new operational 
processes require vertical integration connecting different parts of the supply chain to drive 
value through transparency and process automation. This operational requirement compelled 
both firms to address the changes along with their supply chain partners. While both firms 
were able to initiate and implement changes within the firm, they encountered challenges in 
dealing with the impact of disruptive technology on their existing supply chain partners, as 
reflected in the following comment: 
We had suppliers who were reluctant to make changes. It was extremely difficult to 
get everybody on board. They needed to change, and that meant at some point they 
had to invest quite heavily in upgrading their facilities and processes in order to 
integrate disparate sources of data from different applications. You can’t simply move 
by yourself. You have to get the whole supply network to come with you. (Tie, 011b) 
In addition to the supply-side of their network, many informants identified a number 
of external factors pushing their companies to engage with a broader network of actors. These 
included: underdeveloped internet bandwidth and enterprise connections; fast growing data 
and software companies; and a low-skilled labour force. These institutional conditions served 
as stimuli for both firms to co-develop with their external partners. This marks a clear 
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departure from the firm’s reliance on previous supply-side networks towards a broader 
network system. For instance, the founder of Tie commented:  
We have to try to leverage with the whole spectrum of our network partners. For 
example, we look for support from policy makers for funding and technology support; 
universities and training agencies for high-skilled employees; network providers for a 
better internet bandwidth; partners from different sectors to help us develop our new 
“networked” way of thinking; and our customers to get new ideas. (Sho, 009b) 
Phase 3: Co-evolution with the Ecosystem  
In this phase, both firms systematically and continuously explored the possibilities of further 
manufacturing capability development within their extended networks, and began to renew 
their resource base accordingly. When we re-entered the organizations in 2014, the 
transformation process had already entered what several informants later described as the 
‘“ecosystem game’”. The management teams from both firms exhibited an ongoing concern 
for market volatility and fierce competition. Three capability developments were particularly 
evident at this stage: the capability to institutionalize flexible routines; the capability to enrich 
their resource base; and the capability to coordinate extended networks. Additional selected 
quotes are presented in Table 6. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Institutionalizing flexible routines. Informants from both firms made it abundantly clear that 
since time to market and customer responsiveness are key drivers for competitive advantage, 
it was of paramount importance for them to build a flexible manufacturing process. The 
flexibility of their new manufacturing processes was evidenced by the design of production 
lines both within the firm and across their networked partners, which resulted in: the ability to 
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generate added value from individualized customization; a more dynamic allocation of 
resources; and reduced production complexity with fewer constraints. In both firms, the 
ability to build modular blocks to enable operation agility to respond to network partners as 
well as the market was crucial in ensuring competitive advantage. This view is exemplified 
by the following observation:  
We spent a great deal of time and effort trying to build standardized but flexible 
routines to respond to individual customers. We now have many small unit processes 
that are like Chinese lego, where you can change the configuration without 
interrupting the whole process. (Tie, 006b) 
A similar observation was made at Sho, which has a highly automated plant. New 
routines and processes were designed to allow flexible and application-based reconfigurations 
of the production system. In addition to building flexible processes to ensure modular 
reconfiguration, many informants emphasized the importance of building a flexible 
workforce to facilitate the change. No longer focusing on a particular set of skills, workers 
also need to be equipped with IT competencies and knowledge related to a specific job or 
process such as techniques to work with and monitor robots. Senior management teams from 
both companies highlighted that apart from the hard knowledge and skills, the workforce will 
also have to possess greater flexibility to adapt to new roles and work environments, and get 
accustomed to continual interdisciplinary learning. This was represented in the following 
description:  
The flexible process needs to be driven by a flexible workforce. We need staff that 
know how to work with the machines, understand the data and know how to respond 
to the data in real time. They need to take responsibility to make decisions. (Sho, 002b) 
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Enriching the firm’s resources. The goal of resource enrichment is to extend and elaborate 
the firm’s resources and capabilities in order to keep skills up to date. Our evidence revealed 
that in both cases, resource enrichment can be found in the form of learning new skills and 
technology, investing in additional resources that add value to the firm’s existing resource 
portfolio, and co-opting resources available outside the organization. During this phase, both 
firms made substantial investment in hardware and software to further update their 
manufacturing capabilities. This was reflected by one informant as follows: 
We recently invested quite heavily to improve our data analytical skills to minimize 
the time we have to spend identifying the correlation between our 3d body-scanning 
database and the 2d textile material database. (Tie, 004b) 
In addition to updating equipment and human resources, both firms simultaneously 
collaborated with external partners to co-opt critical technical expertise as well as 
infrastructure elements. One senior leader from Sho had this to say about his understanding 
of resource enrichment: 
You have to find different ways to augment your assets. Most companies rely on 
themselves and overlook the huge potential the outside world can bring. We design 
our products through virtual simulation software, which allows open source input to 
spur and improve our designs. Working with our partners, we put our data together 
and think about different business models and patterns to drive more value out of it. 
(Sho, 005b) 
Coordinating extended networks. According to our informants, as their firms build extended 
networks, their capability to coordinate beyond the parameters of the firm becomes of 
paramount importance. Moving from a traditional to a digitalized model requires firms to 
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move beyond the traditional boundaries of functions, production sites and companies. As the 
operational processes become more complex due to the increased integration of different 
technical disciplines and organizations, the firm’s ability to manage different forms of 
cooperation between different partners is crucial. This is reflected by the following 
observation: 
Because everything is networked, you have to have this open mindset about how you 
can connect all the partners to maximize the value of your network. It is not an easy 
job. We are talking about increased integration, increased functionality, increased 
dynamic operations requirement, increased real-time control, and not just your own 
control. You have to know how to work with your external partners, how to manage a 
complex web of connections. (Tie, 001b) 
According to our informants, instead of focusing on individual capabilities, firms 
need to develop their collective capability system as a whole, including their partners’ 
capabilities. The terms ‘“win-win’”, ‘“reciprocal’” and ‘“interdependent’” were frequently 
mentioned throughout our interviews, emphasizing the necessity for firms to coordinate their 
processes with their network partners. This coordination process contributes to the firm’s 
ability to offer unique and innovative value to its customers. As one of the senior managers at 
Sho indicated: 
We need to reposition ourselves as a platform that can connect with different partners. 
To do so, we need the right digital infrastructure and interpersonal skills to interact 
with our network partners. I am not just talking about our direct supply chain 
partners. The concept of Industry 4.0 is only just beginning to emerge and we want to 
work with a broader network of partners to make sense of it together. (Sho, 011b) 
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Interconnecting Mechanisms  
In the previous section, we reported evidence to support a three-phase process model of 
capability development. In the following section, we investigate the causal and sequencing 
relationships between the phases to find out e.g. whether successful completion of the first 
phases of capability development automatically led our firms to phase 2, or whether 
progression depended on some other factors. Next we present our findings relating to these 
mechanisms. 
Leadership competencies. The consistent pattern to emerge over two cases was that 
transitions from phase 1 to phase 2 required leaders to possess a particular set of skills. These 
skills are: 1) the ability to strategically plan the firm’s workforce and 2) the ability to build an 
interdisciplinary system.  
Ability to strategically plan the firm’s workforce. We noted that after the aspiration stage 
where our firms set new strategic goals, both leadership teams paid great attention to ‘“new 
workforce planning’” in order to be able to execute their new strategies. As the factory floors 
became networked, an increasing number of self-regulating systems and intelligent control 
mechanisms were challenging the conventional workforce distribution. Informants repeatedly 
highlighted that although many training and development opportunities were provided to re-
skill the workforce, how to place them to drive the change was a key challenge facing both 
firms’ top management. When asked to describe the key barriers to the actual execution, one 
informant from Sho commented:  
It’s definitely the mind-set of how we view our employees, the work environment, the 
process and the content. On the smart manufacturing floor, the role of our employees and 
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the work content change dramatically. The digitalized or smart manufacturing process 
requires real-time control and you need to know how to plan your workforce and trust 
them by giving them greater responsibility. (Sho, 007b) 
We found many of the secondary sources such as meeting notes confirmed this dilemma. 
A lot of discussion among the senior management teams was centred on the workforce 
planning analysis to get an insight into the necessary actions. Having a clear understanding of 
the new workforce dimension of smart manufacturing was perceived as a prerequisite 
condition for resource transformation.  
Ability to build an interdisciplinary system. In addition to strategic workforce planning, we 
also found a notable pattern between the two cases in their leadership’s attention to building 
an interdisciplinary system. Senior management informants pointed out that as the physical 
flows (the flow of material components through the supply chain) are inextricably integrated 
with their information flow thanks to intelligent connectivity, firms need new forms of 
interdisciplinary thinking. The implication of this change is that mechanical engineering 
should also be inseparable from information technology, and different functions of operations 
processes, such as product design, production and logistics, need to be integrated to form new 
ways of creating value. The senior director from Tie, for example, viewed this competency as 
key to connecting the aspiration stage to the implementation stage.  
The system needs to be T-shaped and interdisciplinary rather than specialized. No 
operation unit can function alone. There has to be complete integration of equipment 
and process management. Physical things become part of the process and everything 
at the plant, the machine and process flow, becomes one single entity. In order to 
make this happen, an interdisciplinary system including the machine and our 
workforce needs to be established. (Tie, 006b) 
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Platform competencies. According to our informants, as firms gradually move towards phase 
3, the organization has to build a platform that connects different network partners to drive 
value creation for its customers. The level of focus therefore goes beyond firm-level analysis 
to the network-level of analysis. In order to make the successful transition from phase 2 to 
phase 3, the firm’s platform competency is therefore paramount. Within this competency, two 
specific abilities were highlighted during our interviews: 1) ability to build a digital platform 
infrastructure; 2) ability to motivate platform participation.  
Ability to build a digital platform infrastructure. At phase 3, the firm no longer focuses on 
internal and supply-side operational developments. As smart manufacturing drives full 
transparency, the firm must extend beyond the limits of an individual factory to interconnect 
multiple players within its extended network. However, both firms highlighted that a lack of 
interoperability posed great challenges for full integration. The key condition to solving this 
problem, according to our informants, is to build a ‘“functional, user-friendly and 
compatible’” digital platform infrastructure to enable collaboration. As one informant 
commented:  
You need a ‘technology enabler’ to do the job, which means that you need to design 
an architecture, I would prefer to call it a “platform”, that is stable enough to keep 
everything networked together. Without this intra-firm IT infrastructure, you are 
unable to unlock the full potential of digital manufacturing. (Sho, 007b) 
Our informants pointed out that this architecture needs to include shared services and 
applications to enable collaborative processes. A range of issues including data security, 
reliability, operator model convergence, real-time analysis and forecasting all need to be 
resolved for successful platform collaboration to happen. As one Tie informant commented:  
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Availability of an efficient network infrastructure with high internet bandwidths is key to 
guaranteeing digital collaboration. Our system is progressing because the broadband 
internet infrastructure for the industrial level is being developed in China. (Tie, 011b) 
Ability to motivate platform participation. Another key prerequisite condition for firms to 
move from phase 2 to phase 3 is the firm’s ability to motivate and stimulate external partners 
to participate in unlocking further value creation opportunities. This is illustrated by the 
following quote:  
There is huge potential for our manufacturing development to turn “dumb” 
production into ‘smart’ production, to turn mass standardization into mass 
customization, to bypass all the intermediaries and connect directly with customers, 
the list is long. But this potential can only be unlocked if you are able to encourage 
your partners to work together. Without their contribution or participation, your 
network is going to be an ‘empty’ network. (Tie, 002b)  
We observed that both firms were actively engaged in interacting with their network 
partners. It was highlighted by the top management teams from both firms that the tipping 
point is reached when the manufacturing firm starts to provide significant and sustainable 
value to the broader ecosystem. For example, one informant commented:  
The key point to build an ecosystem is to evaluate what your influence points are and 
how your influence points matter to others. So it is about identifying how and why you 
matter to others businesses, how you can offer an integrated service as a whole. (Sho, 
010b)  
DISCUSSION  
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In this section, we present an inductively-derived process model (Figure 2) that not only 
shows how capabilities are formed and developed to support digital transformation, but also 
sheds light on the specific mechanisms to interconnect different stages of the manufacturing 
firm’s capability development.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  
Although many scholars in the field of strategic management agree that dynamic 
capabilities contribute to the firm’s competitive advantage, empirical investigations of the 
specific process by which manufacturing firms from emerging economies transform and 
renew their resources to respond to radical technological change are scarce. Furthermore, the 
extant studies in the strategic management discipline tend to focus on the correlation between 
manufacturing capability and the firm’s competitive advantages, and on the attributes of 
manufacturing capabilities. Consequently, although we know that a number of manufacturing 
capabilities such as manufacturing flexibility and supplier integration represent key 
competitive advantages, the formation and development of these capabilities remain 
insufficiently understood. This study is significant in that it represents one of the first in-
depth studies of how the dynamic capabilities of Chinese manufacturing firms are developed 
over time.  
We also contribute to existing theory by demonstrating how certain capabilities are 
manifested at different stages of the firm’s development. Some of the capabilities we 
highlight, such as unlearning, building a collective learning culture and institutionalizing 
flexible routines, share resemblances with capabilities noted in other industries in emerging 
economies, e.g. removal of rigidities (Kale, 2010); organizational learning (Malik & Kotabe, 
2009); adaptation and innovation (Dixon et al, 2014). However, we disagree with the 
assumption that dynamic capability development is a path-dependent process (Helfat & 
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Peteraf, 2003; Teece et al., 1997). Contrary to this assumption, our study shows that when 
faced with disruptive change, the firm’s ability to unlearn from past experience and routine is 
essential to address the need for organizational change. The concept of unlearning has long 
been associated with the firm’s ability to create and apply new knowledge and new 
knowledge structures (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Cepeda-Carrion, Navarro, & Martinez-Caro, 
2012; Day, 1994). As Cepeda-Carrion et al. (2012) observe, unlearning is not only a 
mechanism to forget or discard old knowledge, but is also the way in which companies are 
able to develop and make room for new knowledge. This capability is closely associated with 
the firm’s capability to sense and shape opportunities and threats in the environment (Dixon 
& Day, 2010; Dixon, Meyer, & Day, 2014; Teece, 2007). Based on our data, unlearning-to-
learn is an overarching theme of our three-phase process model, manifested by unlearning, 
divesting and enriching the firm’s resources. Consistent with this view, our study shows that 
in the context of Chinese manufacturing firms which previously relied heavily on cheap labor 
and low technological capabilities to produce relatively simple products, unlearning was 
necessary to deal with the rigidities created by organizational path dependence. These 
findings are supportive of earlier assertions that breaking with the past and removing 
rigidities are key to developing new capabilities for firms from emerging economies (Dixon 
et al., 2010; Kale, 2010). 
We also contribute to existing theory by highlighting the importance of 
collaboratively networked organizations and the value of co-creation in the era of digitalized 
industry. Our findings indicate that as production processes are interconnected and value 
creation is no longer restricted to firm-level activities, manufacturing firms need to compete 
collectively with their network partners against the networks of other companies. At this level, 
firms have to orchestrate co-specialized capabilities that can be sourced externally to ensure 
the evolutionary fitness (Helfat, et al., 2007) of increasingly co-specialized asset 
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configurations (Siggelkow, 2002; Teece, 2007). We noted that in order to achieve maximum 
benefit from radical technological development, our two Chinese manufacturing firms 
developed coalitions with a broad range of partners including suppliers, customers, data 
providers, government agencies and even universities (See Table 5). This echoed Dixon and 
her colleagues’ research (Dixon & Day, 2010; Dixon, Meyer, & Day, 2014), which found 
that lack of capability to co-evolve with its institutional environment contributed greatly to 
the failure of the Russian Oil company Yukos. However, despite increasing interest in the 
topic, there does not appear to be much discussion of dynamic capability development on a 
system-wide basis. In this study we explicitly highlight the dynamics of value co-creation, 
and therefore support the view that system-wide investigations are required to understand 
how dynamic capabilities are developed and deployed (Pitelis & Teece, 2010).  
Our findings also shed light on the interconnecting mechanisms that contribute to the 
process of manufacturing firms’ dynamic capability development. Based on our data, we 
have proposed two interconnecting mechanisms which contribute to dynamic capability 
theory by explaining the linkages at different stages of the transformation process. Our 
analysis indicates that dynamic capabilities are emergent and evolving, and that their precise 
manifestations depend on the stage of the organization’s development. Following our chain 
of evidence, we found that the focus and resourcing of capability development shift over time 
as firms evolve due to limited organizational attention (Ocasio, 1997). Therefore, we propose 
that dynamic capability development is not simply about renewing one specific type of 
capability, but rather, it is a meta-capability to learn how to repeatedly renew the firm’s 
overall capability set as a fully integrated package. This is consistent with the concept of 
‘“meta-capability’” (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Collis, 1994, p148; Lewin et al., 2011). 
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This study also offers some insights for practitioners. As we are writing this paper, a 
large number of Chinese firms are in the process of transformation to digitalized 
manufacturing. This research provides some insights into the process of dynamic capability 
development which can be of some benefit to firms and managers considering this 
transformation. Managers need to be aware of the importance of unlearning knowledge which 
was conceived according to previously accepted business logics. Additionally, our firms’ 
ability to invest in developing their resource bases was crucial due to the shortage of R&D 
and skilled technological and managerial labor in the local environment. Our results also 
highlighted that in addition to harnessing their resource potential from within, firms should 
seek broader potential value creation opportunities with external partners. By being part of an 
ecosystem, a firm can have more flexibility to drive its innovation capabilities and to leverage 
its partners’ resources to gain a sharper competitive edge. Both cases offer informative 
concepts and behaviour patterns that managers can use to make deeper and richer 
assessments of the ways in which they manage their firms’ internal and external resources to 
create more sustainable value.  
CONCLUSION  
By providing a new theoretical framework grounded in qualitative evidence from two 
Chinese companies, this research provides an important contribution to our knowledge of the 
development of dynamic capabilities in the new era of digitalized manufacturing. The process 
model presented here was derived from data from two specific manufacturing firms in China. 
However, no claim is made that the capabilities presented in this paper are exhaustive since 
the extent to which the processes and capabilities described in this research apply to other 
contexts can only be ascertained through further testing and investigation. In addition, this 
investigation focused on China, where market imperfections and scarcity of resources are 
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particularly pressing. Whether our findings are replicable in other cultural settings or are 
unique to Chinese contexts is an empirical question, which further research might investigate 
either using similar in-depth case study designs as ours or using quantitative methods. 
Findings from such studies could then be used to expand or test our model on other industries 
from different countries.  
Furthermore, due to the novelty of the digitalization of manufacturing, this research 
raises a number of interesting and fertile paths for future research to explore new theoretical 
frameworks and test extant theories of operations management in new contexts. Research 
could also address questions such as: how compatible this colossal sharing across databases is 
with the absorptive capacity of today’s business organizations; and finally, how 
manufacturing firms develop the capabilities required to stimulate ecosystem collaborations. 
We also consider that future research should specifically investigate manufacturing firms in 
other emerging economies in order to evaluate whether the findings in this study can be 
replicated there. By providing a new theoretical framework grounded in qualitative evidence 
from two Chinese companies, this research provides an important contribution to our 
knowledge of the development of dynamic capability in emerging economies in the era of 
digitalized manufacturing. 
 
 
NOTES 
The authors would like to thank their anonymous reviewers for their patience and extremely 
helpful hints over several revisions of this paper, particularly for one of the reviewers’ 
suggestion on framing of the notion of dynamic capability as a meta-capability.  
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Table 1. Background characteristics and data sources for cases  
Company name  
 
Tie  Sho  
Background characteristics  
 
Company Tie previously focused on 
manufacturing standard suits. Went 
through an organization change and 
currently produces highly customized 
products at scale and affordable cost to 
address the trend toward mass 
personalization by leveraging big data and 
cloud computing technology. 
Company Sho has been manufacturing electronic 
goods since its inception. Transformed and built 
a plant that allows full visibility of plant 
operations, remote monitoring and control and 
real time optimization through technologies such 
as internet of things, machine to machine 
communication and 3d printing. 
Sector Textile  Electronic  
Year of establishment  1995  1996  
Number of employees (approximately) 5,000 6,000 
Semi-structured interviews   Tracking the process of digital 
transformation and firms’ dynamic 
capability development during the process 
31 26 
Archival sources   Reconstruct the history of the organization  Triangulate informants’ recollections   Help track external responses and coverage 
to organizational actions   Triangulation of informants’ claims about 
the events and culture of the organization 
Press articles  
Internal correspondence and memos  
Minutes of meetings 
Company newsletters  
Company reports  
 
Press articles  
Internal correspondence and memos  
Minutes of meetings 
Company newsletters  
Company reports  
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Table 2. Breakdown of interviews by company, hierarchical level, and period  
 Tie Sho 
Hierarchical level 
 
Period 1 (a) 
(July–September 2009)  
Period 2 (b) 
(April–June, 2014) 
Period 1 (a) 
(July–September 2009) 
Period 2 (b) 
(April–June, 2014) 
Top management  
 
4 3 4 2 
1 CEO/Co-Founder  
1 Chief Operations Manager 
2 Senior Purchasing 
Directors  
 
1 CEO/Co-Founder  
1 Deputy Chief Operations 
Manager  
1 Senior Purchasing Director 
1 CEO/Founder  
2 Senior Operation Directors  
1 Senior Supply Chain 
Manager 
1 CEO/Founder  
1 Deputy Operations 
Director 
Middle management  
 
8  5 6 4 
2 Business Development 
Managers  
1 Human Resource Manager  
2 Information System 
Managers  
2 Factory Floor Supervisors 
1 Supplier Relationship 
Manager  
 
1 Business Development 
Manager  
1 Information system 
Manager 
1 Factory Floor Supervisor  
1 Product Design Manager  
1 Supplier relationship 
Manager 
1 Purchasing Manager  
1 R&D Manager  
2 Engineer Managers  
1 Team Director  
1 Supply Network Manager  
 
1 Engineer Manager  
1 R&D Manager  
1 Supply Network Manager 
1 E-system Supervisor 
lower-echelon 
employees  
 
5 6  4 5 
3 Factory Floor Employees 
2 Supplier Network 
Assistants  
 
4 Factory Floor Employees 
(2)  
1 Supplier Network Assistant 
1 Product Design Assistant  
3 Factory Floor Employees  
1 Purchasing Assistant 
3 Factory Floor Employees 
(1) 
1 Purchasing Assistant 1 
Engineer Assistant 
Total  17  14 14 11 
 
Notes: Positions in italics are the same people that were involved in the first stage of data collection. Quotation code cited in the paper will be as 
follows (Company name, interview number and period).  
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Table 3. Stages in theory development  
Analytical goal for stage  Raw data used  Analytical procedure and its 
outcome  
Implication for new theory 
development  
Describing the patterns of 
digital transformation in the 
focal companies.  
Interviews, company 
newsletters and reports, and 
featured articles.  
Thematic analysis. Producing a 
timeline of evolution of the firms.  
Radical yet comprehensive 
transformation. 
Specifying the capability 
development actions 
associated with each 
transformation stage.  
Case histories, interviews, 
company newsletters and 
reports.  
Break down the broad capability 
categories and reconceptualize the 
data; sequential coding of types of 
capability development actions into 
a timeline according to capability 
categories. 
Types of capability development 
would seem to change depending 
on what is needed at different 
stages of firms’ digital 
transformation. 
 
Uncovering interconnecting 
mechanisms that drive the 
sequences of capability 
development.  
Interviews, internal 
correspondence and memos, 
minutes of meetings. 
Coding of transition mechanisms 
that drive the sequence of the firms’ 
transformation, leading to different 
capability developments.  
Dynamic capability is not simply 
renewing a specific type of 
capability but a meta-capability to 
learn to repeatedly renew the 
firm’s overall capability set as a 
fully integrated package.  
Developing an overall 
theoretical framework.  
Interviews, case histories and 
data linked to new constructs.  
Revision of the earlier framework, 
connect new construct to overall 
context to produce theoretical 
framework.  
The level of dynamic capability 
development gradually evolves 
from firm level to network level.  
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Table 4. Phase 1–Establishing a new focus of attention: core capabilities and illustrative quotes  
Core capability  
 
Illustrative quotes  
Unlearning from past 
experience and history 
‘There were so many competitors in the Dongguan region doing the same thing. Some of the senior managers were comfortable doing what 
they had been doing for years but I knew something needed to be done. Letting the past go is the most painful part of the process. If you don't 
tip your old thoughts away and make space for new ideas, you will never be able to make the move’. (Sho, 008a)  
‘We were granted many awards and nominated as the best enterprise in our regions, so we got loads of contracts. Many people find it difficult 
to understand why we wanted to change when we were that successful. As the CEO of the company, I know such success can cook you in a slow 
heat if you don't make a move to change. It’s like the frog story. We could milk our success at least for the next 3–5 years, then what? We need 
to disrupt ourselves before someone else disrupts us, or before the environment disrupts us’. (Tie, 002a) 
‘The discussion then about the technology was very exciting and the potential changes it will have on the whole industry is huge. The most 
important thing is that you need to look beyond what you have now, and think from a completely new angle to think how you can do things 
differently’. (Tie, 005a) 
Investing in new 
resource bases  
 
‘There is a big gap between us and companies from Germany and Japan in terms of software development, key technology and patent 
development, R&D development and skilled employees. We had to invest significantly to attract and develop new talents and buy some 
equipment and technologies to make a start’. (Sho, 004a)  
‘When you talk about the technology, our IT infrastructure was far from ready to make the transition. Nobody (in China) cared about that kind 
of technology before. Good enough technology and equipment can do the job. Back then, we wanted an ERP (Enterprise Resource P lanning) 
system that could support mass customization, but no firms, not even in Germany, had established such a system. So we had to develop it 
ourselves. Lots of money has been spent on building this system’. (Tie, 006a)  
‘We are talking about a completely different game here. We didn't have the necessary talent and skilled employees to do the job, neither did we 
have the technology or infrastructure that were needed. If you are serious about change, you have to get your wallet out and spend to upgrade 
everything you have’. (Sho, 013a)  
Building a collective 
learning culture  
 
‘We were worried that we would lose our jobs. There was a lot of speculation about how robots were going to replace us. Why do we need you 
if we can have robots doing jobs 24/7?  We were surprised to see how many training and further development opportunities were provided for 
us. It was the first time we felt that we had the opportunity of not being just “da gong zai” workers (low status migrant workers) and that we 
would be valued here if we wanted to learn’. (Sho, 010a) 
‘I still remember how excited I was about being part of the change. They painted a fascinating picture of how the future would be. To be part of 
the change, we needed to learn many new things. It was like starting from the beginning again. We all have the same starting point and it's 
about how much we learn, how quickly we learn makes us ahead of everyone else. I remember there were a lot of passionate discussions at 
work and after work about how we were going to make a difference’. (Tie, 007a) 
‘People often prioritize technology over everything. To me, it is the culture that makes a difference. Technology is just technology, I am not 
saying that it is not important. What I am saying is that it’s about how people use the technology, how people think differently to maximize the 
benefits that technology may bring. We want people to get thirsty (for learning). We want people to get excited about the idea’. (Tie, 003a)  
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Table 5. Phase 2–Focusing on resource transformation: core capabilities and illustrative quotes  
Core capabilities  
 
Illustrative quotes  
Experimentation  
 
‘When electricity was invented, Ford completely changed the assembly line and transformed the whole production process. The same ca n 
be applied to the smart manufacturing era. But there is no best practice available for us to learn from. We need to think differently about 
the layout of the production floor, the sequences of the job, and we have to learn it bit by bit to see what works’. (Sho, 012a)  
‘When we were first trying out the new production process of mass customization, repair rates were reaching 80%. Now we have made a 
gradual improvement to lower it down to around 50%. I know, we still have a long way to go. We just have to be persistent and patient. 
There was no magic solution that we could pick up within a short period of time. We have to keep trying. You learn from your mistakes’. 
(Tie, 016a) 
‘Having the right technology and equipment is only step 1, how to maximize the efficiency of such tangible asset is step 2. People forget 
that Industry 4.0 is not a standard process, it’s a data driven process. You have different data sets from a different consumption 
environment, so how you design your operation has to be different as well. Simply relying on imported technology is definitely not the 
answer. You have to figure things out bit by bit to see how they can work to their best potential’. (Sho, 005a)  
Divesting the existing 
resource base 
 
‘We have been investing quite heavily in our operations ever since our company was first established. However, when you make radical 
changes, you need to take everything apart to see how it contributes to our next strategic goal. Then you have a lot of chopping to do’. 
(Tie, 009b) 
‘It is hard when it comes down to money. All the machines and equipment, the operations processes that took years to build. You can’t be 
like a hoarder and want to keep everything just because you paid for it. You need to trim off the unnecessary fat to build up the core 
muscle’. (Sho, 006a)  
‘The decision was not easy to make because we were making good money from our existing resources. We made a list of things tha t were 
assets in the short, medium and long term to find out which ones could contribute to our core strength. Then the cutting business began’. 
(Tie, 007a)  
Building extended 
networks 
 
‘We rely heavily on upstream and downstream supply chain networks to produce our products. A chain of network partners were involved 
in our value chain process. So when you want to make radical moves, you need to think about how it will affect the rest of your supply 
chain network, or whether you have a network such as suppliers and logistics providers to support your business model. If the answer is 
no, you better start now to build or restructure your network’. (Tie, 004a)  
‘Although we have spent quite a bit of money on our own research and development, it still has a long way to go to catch up with our 
counterparts in Germany and Japan. We can’t just sit there and wait for things to happen. We are very active and get support from the 
local government in terms of the financial funds and build collaborative relationship with universities for research and development 
opportunities. We also went to Germany to learn from them. Clumsy birds have to start flying early’. (Sho, 006b)  
‘People always associate operations with people with hard hats, working hard on the shop floor, with no idea about any parts of the 
business outside of production. Those days are gone. It’s all about connectivity. When the data and machines are all connected, you are 
not alone. You are connected with all the data providers outside your company, the suppliers and customers etc. How to build all that, how 
to integrate it and make it all work seamlessly is the key’. (Tie, 011b)  
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Table 6. Phase 3–Co-evolution with the ecosystem: Core capabilities and illustrative quotes 
Core capability Illustrative quotes 
Institutionalizing flexible 
routines  
 
‘The old days where you closed the doors and focused on manufacturing products are long gone. If you are still running like this, be 
warned, you are quickly becoming obsolete. The new game is that you need to keep your doors open to connect with your partners, 
everything is connected now, and things change quickly. You need to build a  flexible, simple process or routines to respond to the 
change’. (Sho, 005b)  
‘Product, equipment, and resources are all networked, and different stages of production are logged, with discrepancies registered 
automatically. This means that any malfunction, fluctuation in quality or machinery breakdown can be dealt with quickly. You have to 
have flexible and agile systems or processes to respond to it. Otherwise what is the point of using them’? (Sho, 006b) 
‘When you move away from mass standardized production to mass customization, it is all about modularization, how quickly and how 
flexible your operation units can be separated and recombined to produce different products. Modularization includes your production 
process, your embedded software and your employees’. (Tie, 001b)  
Enriching the firm’s 
resources  
 
‘You have to keep building your portfolio, to see what is valuable out there and how to build it into your portfolio. I believe that we are 
still at the beginning of a  massive change, not just our own firm, not just our industry. It's the whole paradigm, the business paradigm. It 
is important that we keep absorbing, understanding what is going on and constantly extend what we have to build up our core strength’. 
(Tie, 004b)  
‘It is important to identify complementary assets and resources from the market so you need to be constantly looking for new things, and 
thinking how they could be integrated into your existing assets to create new value. There are many valuable resources out there and the 
potential is huge’. (Tie, 009b)  
‘While the output is a physical object, it all begins with information, the data. You want to be part of a data pool to get more value out of 
your data. It is more valuable when your data is integrated and combined with other datasets, so you have a more accurate and complete 
picture of what to do. This data extension will put you in a better position’. (Sho, 010b)  
Coordinating extended 
networks  
 
‘You need to proactively engage in your network because you are depending on them to make it work. The infrastructure (in China) 
needs at least 3-5 years to build up so you need to make it happen. We put customers in the middle and build a circle with our partners to 
design and deliver the best customer experience for them. So you are constantly in the loop of what is going on’. (Sho, 002b)  
‘You build the network. That is the first step. The next step is to coordinate it to build compatibility and harmony, to make sure that what 
you are doing is relevant to what they do’. (Tie, 013a)  
‘We have to look beyond production and think more about coordination: coordination between different machines and coordination 
between the different datasets which come from our partners and our own factory. Even though it is highly automated, coordina ting the 
process to ensure a constant product flow is the most important thing’. (Sho, 008b)  
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Figure 1. Timeline of the emergence and evolution of key issues in the transformation process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Timeline  Tie Sho 
Key activities:  
1) Restructuring the leadership team  
2) IŶǀestiŶg iŶ deǀelopiŶg the firŵ’s oǁŶ highlǇ fleǆiďle 
enterprise resource planning system 
3) Investing in acquiring/building new managerial and 
staff skills  
4) Stimulating a collective learning culture within the 
organization  
 
Key activities:  
1) Arrival of a new leadership team  
2) Investing in robotic machinery from overseas  
3) Retraining the firŵ’s eǆistiŶg ǁorkforĐe 
4) Providing learning-related promotion/development 
opportunities  
 
Key activities:  
1) Experimenting with new tailored measurement 
systems, manufacturing floor layout, management 
structure  
2) Re-evaluatioŶ of the firŵ’s eǆistiŶg taŶgiďle assets  
3) Rebuilding a new supply chain network to enable 
personalized garment production  
 
Key activities:  
1) Experimenting with operating system connectivity, 
manufacturing floor layout, management structures  
2) Gradually sheddiŶg the firŵ’s eǆistiŶg assets 
3) Liaison with suppliers to update the new operations 
systems (e.g., embedding sensors)  
 
Key activities:  
1) Building a flexible operations structure to enable 
mass personalization of garments  
2) EǆteŶdiŶg aŶd elaďoratiŶg the firŵ’s resourĐes to 
drive innovation  
3) CooperatiŶg ǁith the firŵ’s eǆteŶded Ŷetǁork 
partners to unlock further value creation 
opportunities  
Key activities:  
1) Building a flexible operations structure to enable 
highly automated manufacturing production  
2) BuildiŶg a resourĐe portfolio ǁith the firŵ’s eǆterŶal 
partners to drive innovation  
3) CooperatiŶg ǁith the firŵ’s eǆteŶded Ŷetǁork 
partners to build a better infrastructure to 
ĐoŶtiŶuouslǇ iŵproǀe the firŵ’s eǆistiŶg operatioŶs 
systems  
2006-2008 
Phase 1 
2008-2013 
Phase 2 
 
2014-
present 
Phase 3 
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Figure 2. A process model of capability development  
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Coordinating 
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Leadership Competencies  The ability to strategically 
plan the firm’s workforce  The ability to build an 
interdisciplinary system 
Platform Competencies  The ability to build a 
digital platform 
infrastructure  The ability to motivate 
platform participation 
